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I 
INTRA-HOUSEHOLD RESOURCE ALLOCATION: 
AN INFERENTIAL APPROACH 
Abstract 
If household.income is pooled and then allocated to maximize welfare, then 
income under the control of mothers and fathers should have the same impact on 
demand. With survey data on family health and nutrition in Brazil, the 
equality of parental income effects is rejected. Unearned income in the hands 
of mothers has a bigger effect on her family's health than income under the 
control of fathers; for child survival probabilities the effect is almost 
twenty times bigger. The common preference (or neoclassical) model of the 
household is rejected. If unearned income is measured with error and income is 
pooled then the ratio of maternal to paternal income effects should be the 
same; equality of the ratios cannot be rejected. There is also evidence for 
gender preference: mothers prefer to devote resources to improving the 
nutritional status of their daughters, fathers to sons. 
1. Introduction 
There are remarkably few empirical examinations of how households allocate resources among 
their members. In most (but not all) household surveys, consumption and expenditure data are 
collected at the household rather than individual level and so individual consumption is not directly 
observed. This poses no problem for goods, such as leisure, which are consumed by only one 
member in the household: but there are few such goods and their identification is not trivial. Most 
empirical tests of household allocation models have, therefore, focused on leisure demand (or labor 
supply). 
The theoretical literature on economic models of household behavior dates back at least to 
Becker's (1964) extension of the neoclassical model of (individual) consumer demand to families. 
All members of the household are assumed to jointly maximize some household level welfare 
function and income is allocated so that the marginal rate of substitution between any two goods is 
the same as for any other pair. Essentially, as long as the household remains intact, it may be 
treated as if it acts as a single individual; put another way, all resources are pooled and then re­
allocated according to some common rule. 
Recently, research has focussed on explicitly modelling intra-household allocation within a 
bargaining framework\ as a Pareto efficient outcome2, by assuming a particular structure for 
parental preferences 3, or within a class-based model of conflict4• All these models permit 
heterogeneity in preferences among household members but differ in assumptions about the 
allocation mechanism. Unlike the Beckerian model, there is an incentive for household members not 
to pool income but rather to allocate resources over which they have discretion towards goods they 
especially care about. 
1See Manser and Brown, (1980), McElroy and Horney, (1981, 1988), Ulph, (1988) in the economic 
literature and Blumberg (I 988) for a review of the sociological literature. 
2Chiappori, (1988a) and Kooreman, (I 988). 
3Behrman, Pollak and Taubman, (I 982, 1985). 
4Folbre (I 986). 
The aim of this paper is to determine whether the Beckerian model of common preferences 
is consistent with data; rejection of this simple model should be a precursor to a search for an 
alternative structural model of household decision making. Instead of examining individual leisure 
demands, we shall attempt to infer how resources are allocated by focusing on a series of outcomes 
of household resource allocations: in particular nutrient intake, child health, survival and fertility. 
According to the Beckerian model, the effect on these outcomes of unearned income should be the 
same, independent of who controls it. However, if the number and healthiness of children enter 
parents' utility functions differently and if household resources are not pooled, then each parent will 
want to allocate a different quantity of resources to these outcomes; the effect of unearned income 
of the father may be different from that accruing to the mother. It is this joint hypothesis which 
will be tested using a large scale household survey from Brazil. 
Secondly, we shall present evidence on whether parents display gender preferences. If the 
common preference model of household resource allocation is incorrect then these gender preferences 
should also be reflected in differential resource allocations depending on who controls income. 
2. Models of household behavior 
Models of household behavior considered in this paper can all be cast in the same framework 
as a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. For a particular household, welfare in any period, 
W, is a function of M individual utility functions, U 1, U 2 ... UM, where M is the number of 
household members: 
W - W[Ul (X,Z), [l] 
Xis a vector of commodity demands including leisure and Z is a vector of home-produced (or non­
marketed) goods such as child health and quality. If there are N goods then X will be of dimension 
N*M with typical element, Xirn• the consumption of the ith good by the mth member. The model 
is quite general; it imposes weak separability between the felicity functions and separability between 
the inputs into the Z-good production functions and the elements of X in each felicity function. 
2 
If the utility of member m does not enter the aggregator function, then it will be assigned 
a weight of zero. In the special case that the utility of a member, m, depends only on his own 
This representsconsumption then Xi.£ will carry weight zero for all #min the utility function Um. 
egotistical preferences (Chiappori, 1988a). 
In most survey data, it is only household consumption of good i, Xi=EmXim• rather than 
individual consumption, which is observed although leisure is the exception to this rule. Household 
welfare is maximized subject to the budget constraint: 
p X w T + y [ 2] m m 
and production function for each Z: 
[3]Z = Z (X) 
where all prices are included in vector p and Ym is the unearned income of member m; wm, which 
is an element of p, is the price of time of household member m. Then there exists an household 
demand function for each element of X and Z, denoted x;, which depends on all prices, including 
wages, and unearned income of each member: 
X.* = ~M X.* g(p, Y1, ... [ 4) 
1 1m 
In the empirical work below, we shall maintain the strong assumption that unearned income is 
exogenous and therefore ignore the fact the current unearned income probably reflects past labor 
supply decisions. It would be preferable to model household resource allocation within a dynamic 
framework or, perhaps, using the level of resources brought to the marriage (Schultz, 1988b); neither 
option is feasible with the data used in this paper. 
The simplest static model of the household assumes either that all household members have 
exactly the same preferences or that a dictator makes all allocation decisions in which case the 
member of the household's utilityaggregator function W(.) assigns a zero weight to all but one 
function. For the purposes of this paper, the two assumptions are observationally equivalent and 
we refer to them as the common preference model; it is often called the neoclassical model and 
underlies Becker's (1964, 1974, 1981) discussion of household formation. For this model to be 
3 
correct, it is necessary that the household act as if it pools all unearned income and thus the demand 
functions depend only on total household unearned income and not its components. 
X. * = )'nM X. * = [5] 
l. L-rn im 
These are testable restrictions, not observed in demands based on the general model, [4]. 
We consider two classes of models which differ from the neoclassical or common preference 
model and refer to them under the general rubric of individual preference models since they 
emphasize the role of individuals within the household. The first relies on notions of bargainin2 
within the household. Manser and Brown (I 980) discuss both a Nash and Kalay-Smorodinsky 
definition of bargaining equilibrium; McElroy and Horney (1981, 1988) and Horney and McElroy 
(1988) focus on Nash equilibrium; Bjorn and Vuong (1987a 1987b) examine both Nash and 
Stackelberg bargaining models. Ulph (I 988) considers a non-cooperative Nash model. 
Assume, for the moment, that the Nash equilibrium is the appropriate concept and there are 
M players in the household allocation game. They will choose X and Z to maximize the product 
of the differences between the utility level each achieves, um, and the threat point or reservation 
utility level, V~, each would achieve outside the household. 
subject to the budget constraint, [2], and production function for Z, [3]. Am represents non-price 
characteristics of the environment an individual would face if he withdrew from the household and 
Ym is the unearned income he would take away with him. It is assumed that non-wage income is 
perfectly transportable so that the amount he would carry with him is equal to the amount he controls 
while a member of the household 5• There exist a set of household demands for each good, i: 
5Ulph (1988), Folbre (1984) and Blumberg (1988) argue that bargaining power depends on the 
proportion of total income each member controls. This would be true if labor supplies are 
exogenously given and no household member has a claim on the earnings of another member if the 
household splits up. The empirical results reviewed in Blumberg (1988) make this assumption and 
are, therefore, hard to interpret. 
4 
X. * - ~ x~ - [6] 
l. L;n 1.m 
which depend on prices, unearned income of each member and characteristics Am. In contrast with 
the common preference model, each element of household unearned income, y1...yM, enters the 
bargaining model demand functions separately (see Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 
1981). 
Chiappori (1988a, 1988b) has made the appealing argument that imposing a bargaining 
concept on the household allocation problem is quite restrictive and these restrictions are hard to test. 
He proposes assuming only that household allocations are Pareto-efficient; see, also, Kooreman, 
(1988). As long as members are not purely egotistical then Chiappori argues the implications of 
his model cannot be distinguished from the neoclassical model except within a revealed preference 
or non-parametric framework (Afriat, 1967; Varian, 1982). 
This seems overly strong. In the absence of complete pooling of income, a change in non­
wage income under the control of different members will have the same effect on demands only if 
the dictatorial model is correct. If household allocations are assumed to be Pareto efficient, but 
parents have different preferences, then demands should depend on prices and individual components 
of unearned income: 
[7] 
The implication that unearned income should enter the demand functions [4] in the same way, 
independent of the source of income is a key feature of the dictatorial model, which is not shared 
by the general model [4] or either of the class of individual preference models discussed above. This 
suggests a simple and appealing test of the common preference model against a broad class of 
alternatives6• Rejection of the equality of income effects does not imply acceptance of any one of 
6Some of the Marxian-feminist models assert that women's bargaining power is independent of the 
resources she controls but depends on societal norms (Hartman, 1981 ). Within the context of the 
test on unearned income, this model is observationally equivalent to the dictator model. 
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these alternatives; the fact there are plausible alternatives does, however, suggest the test has some 
power. 
McElroy and Horney (1981) report equality of income effects as one of the tests of the 
bargaining model. Using National Longitudinal Survey data, they find they cannot reject the 
hypothesis that non wage income accruing to the husband, wife and other members of the household 
have the same effect on male and female labor supply. 
Using household expenditure data from Thailand, Schultz (1988a, 1988b, 1989) demonstrates 
that a woman's unearned income has a significantly larger negative effect on the probability that she 
enters the wage labor force than does her husband's unearned income. The reverse is true for men. 
He also examines the impact of nonwage income on fertility rates: holding expenditure constant, 
more unearned income in the hands of women tends to (significantly) raise fertility; it is little 
affected by husband's non-wage income. 
3. Nutrient intake and indicators of child health 
This paper will study three levels of data from a large scale household survey. First, at the 
household level, nutrient intakes -- in particular calories and protein -- are considered. Second, for 
each woman who has ever born a child, we examine the determinants of fertility and child survival 
rates. Third, two anthropometric indicators -- height (conditional on age) and weight (conditional 
on height) -- for children less than eight years old are analyzed. The two nutrient intakes are X­
goods and the four health indicators are Z-goods in the demand functions, [4]. 
Analysis of nutrient intakes is a straightforward extension of demand analysis; see Behrman 
and Deolaliker (1988) for a review and discussion of the current debate about the size of income 
effects. A small number of studies have used individual nutrient intake data to study intra­
household inequality in nutrient intake (Behrman, l 988; Behrman and Deolaliker, 1989; Pitt, 
Rosenzweig and Hassan, 1989). No studies, however, have estimated elasticities separately for 
income in the hands of males and females in spite of the implications for policies aimed at raising 
nutrition levels in households. 
6 
There is a large literature on levels and determinants of fertility and mortality; for recent 
surveys see, inter alia, Schultz, (1984), Mensch, Lentzner and Preston, (1986). Mother's education, 
and possibly father's education, have a negative impact on fertility and positive effect on child 
survival probabilities. The smaller number of studies have examined the effect of income on these 
outcomes. (Casterline et al., 1987). 
Examinations of child anthropometric indicators are reviewed in Cochran, Leslie and O'Hara 
(1982) and Martorell and Habicht (1986). Among nutritionists, child height for age is considered 
to be a long run measure of nutritional status and weight for height a shorter-run indicator, 
(Waterlow et al., 1977). Parental education and, to a less extent, household income, typically have 
a significant positive .impact on both anthropometric outcomes even after controlling for genetic 
endowment. (Behrman and Deolaliker, I988; Thomas, Strauss and Henriques, 1987, 1988; Behrman, 
1989.) In order to account for the fact that children grow, one might include child's age and 
transformations of it in a regression; a more parsimonious approach is used here. Child height is 
standardized by the median height of a well-nourished child of the same age and sex in a reference 
we use the United States as the reference. (National Center for Ht!allh Statistics, 1974).population; 
Weight, conditional on height, is similarly standardized. 
It is maintained that parents are concerned about all six household and child health outcomes; 
the question is do their preferences differ? If so, and if income is not pooled in the household, then 
these differences should be transmitted into differential parental income effects. 
The empirical model 7 follows directly from [4]: 
X =Mt,+ c [12] 
where M is a vector of prices, including wages, and unearned income of household me~bers. In 
the absence of price data, location dummies are included; instead of mother's and father's wages -
7The number of children ever born takes on only a discrete number of values and so ordinary least 
squares may not be appropriate. Since there are over 20,000 observations and considerably more 
heterogeneity in fertility in these data than-is observed in, say, the United States, taking account of 
the integer problem in estimation is probably of second order importance. The truncation of 
survival rates at O and 1 has been handled by a Tobit (Trussell and Preston, 1980; Thomas, Strauss 
and Henriques, 1987) and modelled as a binomial process (Thomas, Strauss and Henriques, 1988); 
in both cases, the results are virtually identical to those based on least squares. Least squares is, 
therefore, adopted. 
7 
- which are observed only for those participating in the wage market -- parental education is 
included. Unearned income accruing to the mother, father and all others are entered separately. 
Estimated variance-covariance matrices are corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity using the 
infinitesimal jackknife (Jaeckel, 1976; Efron, 1980) also proposed by White (1980). 
4. Data and empirical model 
The common preference model will be tested with Brazilian survey data collected in 1974/5. 
Family structure in Brazil has changed substantially over the last three decades; see Oliveira and 
Berquo, (1988), for a review and Goldani (1989) for a discussion. Whereas in 1960, 46% of the 
population was urbanized, this proportion had risen to almost 80% in 1984 and much of this growth 
may be attributed to migration. Furthermore in Brazil, a.s in much of Latin America, women are 
more likely to migrate so that the ratio of women to men is higher in cities (1.05) than the 
countryside (0.94) and is very high in some cities (1.16 in the Northeast city of Fortaleza, for 
example). At the same time, there has been a tripling of female labor force participation rates to 
about 36% in 1984 and an even more dramatic increase in the proportion of women earning an 
income (from 7% in 1960 to 33% in 1984). Over 40% of women earn less than the minimum wage 
and, on average, they earn less than men; more surprisingly, perhaps, the ratio of female to male 
wages is smallest for illiterates (93%) and greatest for those with college education (only 36%). 
(Neuhouser, 1989). 
While fertility rates have declined from 6.3 in 1960 to 3.6 in I 984 and the infant mortality 
rate has been cut in half (IBGE, I 988), the age at first union and probability of being married have 
remained remarkably stable. Over this period, 88% of men aged 40-49 were married as were 81% 
of women in the 30-39 year age group. The influence of the Catholic church has, however, been 
eroded: the proportion of marriages performed solely in church has fallen by 50%; civil marriages 
have risen in popularity and there has been a doubling of consensual unions -- especially among 
young adults. (Goldani, 1989; Henriques, 1989.) 
In spite of these changes, Brazil remains a machista society, (Neuhouser, 1989), suggesting 
the dictatorial model of household decision making should perform well. Sociologists, however, 
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argue that even within this society, resource allocation decisions are quite complex. They claim that 
women have a good deal of control over expenditures, in particular food expenditures, as well as over 
the distribution of food (Goldani, 1989; Neuhouser, 1989). If this is true and if non wage income 
is a good indicator of power within the household, then differences in the preferences of men and 
women should be reflected in differential effects of parental income on indicators of household and 
child health. 
The Estudo Nacional da Despesa Familiar (ENDEF) is a random national sample of nearly 
55,000 households and is very comprehensive by expenditure survey standards8• In addition to the 
usual income, expenditure and demographic information, the amount of food consumed by the 
household during three 24 hours periods was recorded. This information has been converted into 
nutrient intakes taking account of wastage. The height and weight of all members of the household 
were measured. For each woman, the number of children ever born and the number alive at the 
survey date are also recorded. The data are presented in tabulations by the Brazilian statistical 
agency, (IBGE, 1982); fertility and mortality tables are discussed in National Research Council, 
(1983 ); in addition, nutrient intakes and anthropometric outcomes are discussed in Knight, Mahar 
and Moran (1979). Using the household level data, Thomas, Strauss and Henriques (I 987, 1988) 
examine the determinants of the child health outcomes; Strauss and Thomas (1989) consider the 
relationship between nutrient intakes and measures of income. 
In the survey, each member of the household was asked about their own income and non­
wage income was broken down into income from pensions, social security and workers compensation, 
rents and income from physical assets, financial assets, gifts and other irregular income. Among 
urban households in the survey, 44% of all men and 36% of all women report some income other than 
earnings. In rural households, however, there is very little reported unearned income; 29% of all 
men and only 11 % of women report positive unearned income. The very low proportion of women 
with unearned income is probably due, in part, to the survey design. All income from rural 
enterprises (including farms) was attributed to the head of the household. Women's unearned income 
8 The data used in this study cover the Northeast, Southeast (Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, 
Parana), Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Brasilia. 
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is, therefore, probably under-reported and men's over-reported; this will seriously contaminate tests 
of the allocation model and so, in this paper, only urban households are included: a sample of over 
25,000 households 9• 
Among urban households, almost a quarter of men's income comes from non-earned sources. 
A little less than half of that is from pensions and social security; a quarter is returns on financial 
or physical assets. About 40% of income reported by women is not earned: relative to men, a 
higher proportion is from pensions (over 50%) and social security (almost 20%); rather less is from 
financial or physical assets (13%). 
Table la presents mean total and unearned income by deciles of per capita expenditure 
(PCE)10• Total annual household income is, on average, Cr$31,401 11. Almost a quarter is from non­
earned sources and this proportion tends to increase with PCE although households in the bottom 
decile report relatively high proportions of unearned income12• Fathers account for 76% of total 
household income, mothers receive 13% and the rest accrues to other household members. These 
ratios are remarkably stable across the expenditure distribution. In contrast, the proportion of 
unearned income attributed to the father rises from about 55% in the bottom decile to 75% at the top; 
the mother's share falls from 37% at the bottom to about half that at the top. If the individual 
preference model is correct then mother's unearned income should have a bigger influence on 
consumption patterns at the bottom of the PCE distribution. 
On average, men report Cr$5,500 in unearned income; women report about a quarter of that. 
A third of all men and a fifth of women report some income from nonwage sources so that 
9A subset of the estimates reported below have been replicated with the rural data. In most models, 
we cannot reject the common preference model because income effects are very imprecisely 
measured. 
10Since measured income is likely to reflect a larger transitory component than expenditure, per 
capita expenditure can be thought of as a first approximation to a longer run welfare indicator. 
11Approximately US$2,000. 
12It is likely that some of these households suffered a temporary earnings shock part of which was 
transmitted into expenditures; hence the relatively low share of earned income. 
conditional on receiving nonwage income, the mother-father differential is much smaller: on average, 
the mother receives just over Cr$7 ,500 and the father about twice as much. 
Table 1b presents mean per capita calorie and protein intakes measured at the household level. 
Both tend to rise with expenditure although the relationship between calories and expenditure is 
apparently quite non-linear. When daily per capita calories reaches about 2400, it remains constant 
even as per capita expenditure increases. 
Information on children ever born and the proportion who survived to the survey date are 
recorded for each woman aged 14 to 55. The income characteristics of this dataset are remarkably 
similar to the household level data in Table la. Mean fertility levels and survival rates by deciles 
of PCE are reported ia Table 1b. The average urban woman has 4.7 children and fertility declines 
with PCE; although 60% of women have four children or fewer, more than 10% have ten or more 
children. The average survival probability is 0.86; about 63% of all women do not report the death 
of a child. In the bottom decile of PCE, over 75% of women have lost as least one child, in the top 
decile about 15% and, on average, survival rates tend to rise with PCE. 
The analysis of anthropometric data is restricted to children less than 8 years old and so 
younger (and poorer) households are included in this level of data. The average urban child in 
Brazil has the same weight, conditional on height, as the median child in the United States; the 
longer run indicator of nutritional status, height for age, suggests, however, that Brazilian children 
are not as well nourished. There is considerably more heterogeneity in the shorter than longer run 
nutritional indicators; the standard deviations of weight for height and height for age are 13.7 and 
6.6 respectively. Weight for height and, particularly, height for age, increase with PCE; on average 
a child in a household at the top decile is the same height as the US median child. 
Relative to the household level data, in the child level sample, average income is about 20% 
lower. Unearned income accounts for a smaller proportion of total income (17%), the father controls 
relatively more (80%) and the proportions of mothers and fathers reporting any income from non­
wage sources are slightly smaller (I 4% and 34% respectively). The relationship between all these 
variables and per capita expenditure is, however, very similar in all three levels of data. 
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s. Testing the common preference model 
(i) Tests of equality of income effects 
The reduced form coefficient estimates for unearned income are reported in Table 2 for each 
of the six resource allocation outcomes. Household nutrient intakes are in logarithms and the 
anthropometric indicators are logarithms of US medians. All the regressions include unearned 
income, dummy variables for the education of both parents, whether or not a mother or father exists 
and a dummy variable for each of fifteen states. Also included are the age (and age squared) of the 
household head (in the nutrient regressions), dummies for the age of the mother (in the fertility and 
survival regressions) and dummies for age and sex of the child (in the anthropometric regressions). 
Both parents' unearned incomes are significantly and positively associated with household per 
capita caloric and protein intakes although the relationship is quite non-linear. In fact, the income 
pooling hypothesis cannot be rejected in the caloric regression with linear income terms; relaxing 
the linearity restriction results in a rejection of the hypothesis. In the protein regression, the 
equality of income effects is rejected in both cases. Furthermore, the effect of maternal income on 
nutrient demand is between four and seven times larger than income in the hands of fathers 
(evaluated at mean household unearned income). Relative to men, women apparently direct more 
resources under their control towards improving household nutrition. 
Both men and women use unearned income to reduce fertility and increase the probability 
that their children survive although the male income effects on survival are not significant. The 
absolute magnitudes of women's income effects are much larger than men's: almost twenty times 
bigger for survival rates in both the linear and quadratic models. The income pooling hypothesis is 
again rejected in all cases. 
Mortality risk is a rapidly declining function of a child's age and so it would be desirable to 
control for exposure in these regressions, (Trussell and Preston, l 980). In the absence of information 
on which to compute these controls (such as age at first marriage or even age at first birth), the 
estimates for younger women may be misleading to the extent that more educated, higher income 
women tend to delay child-bearing thus imparting a positive bias in the estimated income 
coefficients. Among older women, failure to standardize is unlikely to have much impact on the 
12 
estimates and so the regressions have been repeated for women who have completed their fertility 
(45 - 55 year olds). The results are virtually identical: the impact of parental income is not the 
same on either fertility or child survival. 
Mother's unearned income also positively affects both anthropometric outcomes; father's 
income is associated with taller children. In both case, linearity of the income effects cannot be 
rejected. Maternal income effects are four to eight times bigger than paternal effects. In the 
anthropometric regressions, the equality of income effects can only be rejected in the weight for 
height regression. 
Unearned income accruing to other household members positively affects height for age and 
is associated with lower fertility; the estimates are quite close to those of fathers' unearned income. 
The hypothesis that income effects of mothers, fathers and others is the same is rejected in all cases 
except height for age. 
If the impact of income on the six health outcomes is not linear then differential estimated 
income effects may be due to differences, across the income distribution, in the proportion of men 
and women who report any unearned income. The income effects have been re-estimated 
•conditional on the mother or father reporting positive unearned income
13 Mother's income still has 
an (absolutely) bigger effect on health outcomes than father's income (Table 3) and these differences 
are significant in the protein intake, fertility, child survival and weight for height regressions. 
Permitting quadratics in income, then the estimated income effects are significantly different in both 
the nutrient intake regressions (with F2 , 27502 statistics of 10.21 and 33.13 for calories and protein, 
respectively). Even conditional on reporting any unearned income, that under the control of women 
has a bigger impact on health than income in the hands of men. 
Unearned income, as measured above, includes income from social security and pensions, 
thus probably incorporating past labor supply behavior. For each respondent in the survey, it is 
possible to identify income from physical and financial assets; asset income is a more appealing 
measure of nonwage resources although not even it is purged of previous labor supply and savings 
13Two dummy variables are included in the regression, one each to identify mothers and fathers who 
report any unearned income. 
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decisions. More importantly, perhaps, very few people report any asset income -- about 12% of 
men and 5% of women. The lower half of Table 3 reports asset income effects on the six health 
outcomes. Both parents' asset income have a positive effect on caloric and protein intake; mother's 
income effects are significantly bigger than fathers. Anthropometric measures are positively 
affected by asset income, although not significantly, and there is no difference between maternal and 
paternal income effects. Fertility and child survival are unaffected by asset income. The lack of 
precision in these estimates is hardly surprising given the proportion of non-zero observations. 
Nevertheless the nutrient intake results, at least, support those based on the broad definition of 
unearned income. 
The common preference (or neoclassical) model of household resource allocation does not 
seem to perform well in these health outcome regressions. Relative to fathers (and other household 
members), mothers appear to be more effective at using the income over which they have control 
to improve the health of their families. 
(ii) Tests when income is measured with error 
In addition to the assumption of exogeneity, there are at least two problems with relying on 
unearned income to test the common preference model. Firstly, according to theory, in the absence 
of credit constraints, the present discounted value of lifetime non-labor income is the appropriate 
income measure to be included in these regressions; current unearned income is a noisy indicator 
of this value 14. Secondly, even current unearned income is difficult to measure in household 
surveys. Rejection of the equality of income effects may be due solely to differential measurement 
errors across individuals in the survey. 
Consider a linear version of [4] and, for ease of exposition, let there be two components to 
household unearned income: maternal and paternal, Ym and Yp• respectively. Letting prices (and all 
other covariates) be £ and dropping the i subscripts, then [4] becomes: 
14If one of the bargaining models is correct, then resources carried away from the household in the 
event it splits up should enter the calculation. 
14 
X* = [8] 
where an asterisk on income denotes the correct measure of wealth. Assume that observed non­
labor income is equal to the correct measure contaminated by a linear error, '7: 
y. - y.* + ']. j=m,p [9] 
J J J 
where '7j has a zero first moment and finite second moment c2f)j· If '7m, '7p, y: and y; are 




Since /3j is a vector, one element for each dependent variable, X"={X Z}, and the contamination term 
in [10] is common across equations, the ratio of maternal (or paternal) income effects across two 
equations, r and q, will be unbiased: 
~ f3
". jr jr




If maternal and paternal income effects are equivalent, then it must be that their ratios will also be 
equivalent. This is an alternative test of the common preference model which permits measurement 
error in unearned income. The cross-equation restrictions, h=om-eP, can be tested with a non­
linear Wald test, x2=h1HVH'f 1h, where H is the matrix of derivatives of the restriction vector, h, 
and V is the variance covariance matrix of the estimated income effects. 
Rejection of the equality of the es implies rejection of the common preference model. The 
test embodies strong assumptions: the regressions must be linear in unearned income and the 
measurement error must be uncorrelated with the correct measure of wealth, all other covariates 
and the regression error term. Unfortunately, failure to reject the equality of ratios does not have 
an unambiguous interpretation. It may be that the income effects are equal; alternatively, if 
mothers value all health outputs included in the test proportionately more than fathers, then the ratio 
of the income effects will be equal. 
15 
Ratios of maternal to paternal income effects are presented in Table 4 together with Wald 
tests for equality of these ratios.
15 The broader definition of unearned income is used in the top 
half of the table. In the nutrient and anthropometric regressions, the ratios are quite similar and the 
x2 statistics are small. In the fertility and survival rate regressions, the ratios differ by a factor of 
2 to 3 but the equality test cannot be rejected.
16 When asset income is used, all the ratios differ by 
a factor of about 2 but since the estimates are imprecise, the x2 are very small. 
Maintaining that non-labor income is measured correctly, then the common preference model 
is not consistent with these data. The ratios of income effects are not significantly different from 
each other: it is not possible to reject the joint hypothesis that unearned income is measured with 
error and there is no correlation among the errors and appropriate measures of wealth, that the health 
outcomes are linear in income and that the common preference model is correct. 
6. Testing for gender effects in anthropometric outcomes 
We turn to a second, related issue: gender bias in household resource allocations and focus 
on child anthropometric indicators 17. Differential allocations to boys and girls can arise in both 
the common preference and individual preference models. Parents may have differential 
preferences with respect to investments in boys relative to girls, there may be differential returns 
to these investments in the labor market or parents may have differential claims on the returns their 
children are expected to receive. 
Many recent studies have compared levels of child health outcomes by sex. In some cases 
differences have been observed, most notably in the Indian sub-continent (D'Souza and Chen (1980), 
15Since the tests are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrices, the matrix 
is not block diagonal. The level of observations varies across the three datasets and so the test 
statistics can only be calculated for each pair. 
16This is because the father's income effect is imprecisely estimated and the covariance between 
father's and mother's unearned income is high. 
17Nutrient intakes are only observed at the household level; it is not possible to test for gender 
preference in their allocation. Similarly, the fertility and child survival data preclude tests for sex 
discrimination. 
16 
Rosenzweig and Schultz, (1982) for mortality; Sen, (1984), Sen and Sengupta (1983) and Behrman 
(1988) for anthropometric indicators) although the significance of some of these differences has been 
questioned (Kakwani, 1987). Outside of Asia, however, it appears that differences in levels of 
outcomes are small and often not significant; see, for example, Strauss, (1988), and Svedberg, (1988), 
on Africa and Schofield, (I 979), on Latin America. Schultz ( 1987) argues that there is evidence for 
gender bias in schooling enrollments and attainments and this bias tends to decline with income. 
Psacharopolous and Arriagada (I 989) present evidence for discrimination against boys in school 
attendance and performance in Brazil. 
Attempts to measure gender bias in the intrahousehold distribution of nutrients suggest boys 
tend to be favored, at least in South Asia (Rosenzweig and Schultz, (1982), and Behrman and 
Deolaliker, (1989), for India; Evenson et al., (1980) and Senauer et al., (1988) for the Philippines; 
Chen, Huq and D'Souza for Bangladesh) although part of these differences can be ascribed to 
different activity levels (Pitt, Rosenzweig and Hassan, (1989) using data from Bangladesh). In 
contrast, in the equivalence scale literature, there is little evidence for gender bias in the allocation 
of expenditures in the Cote d'Ivoire, (Deaton, I 988) and the United States, (Gronau, I 985) 
In the case of child anthropometric outcomes, gender bias can only be identified relative to 
another population: standardizations based on the sample preclude tests for discrimination.
18 We 
shall, therefore, examine the determinants of child anthropometric outcomes and test for differential 
impacts of mother's and father's unearned income on the outcomes of sons and daughters. Assume 
mothers prefer their daughters to be healthy and fathers are more concerned about the health of their 
sons. The effect of household unearned income on these outcomes will be a weighted average of the 
impact of mother's and father's income where the weights are given by the bargaining strength of 
each member. If the common preference model is correct, then there is no reason to distinguish 
/ 
mother's from father's unearned income. 
Mean height for age and weight for height of male and female children are presented in 
Table 5. Relative to the US standards, on average, girls tend to be taller (given age) and heavier 
18If there is systematic gender bias in the reference population but not in the observations, then the 
standardizations could impart spurious gender bias. 
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(given height) than boys and these differences are significant. When four age groups are 
distinguished, girls are significantly taller (given age) than boys only among infants (0-5 months) and 
older children (5-8 years). Older girls are heavier, given height, than boys. One interpretation of 
these results would be that households care more about the health status of girls than boys. It is 
rather hard, however, to also explain the fact that infant boys (0-5 month olds) are significantly 
heavier, given height, than infant girls. An alternative, and entirely plausible, interpretation is that 
the standards chosen (in this case the United States NCHS standards) are inappropriate for urban 
Brazilian children and the sex differentials are spurious. In spite of this difficulty in interpretation, 
almost all the tests for gender bias in the anthropometric literature are based on these sorts of 
comparisons. 
The anthropometric regressions have been repeated for girls and boys separately (Table 6). 
Since differences in mean standardized heights and weights are accounted for by differences in 
intercepts, the impact of covariates should not be affected by the standards chosen. 
Both parent's unearned income are positively associated with each outcome. Mother's 
unearned income has a significant effect on her daughter's weight for height which is about five 
times larger than the (significant) effect on her son's weight: this difference is also significant. 
Although the effect of the mother's income on height is larger for daughters, it is not significant for 
either child. Relative to the effect on daughters, father's unearned income has a significantly bigger 
effect on his son's weight for height and a slightly larger effect on height (but this difference is not 
significant). In spite of this evidence for gender preference, in the case of both sons and daughters, 
mother's income has a bigger impact on heights and weights than father's income. The hypothesis 
that income from each source has the same impact on either boys' or girls' weight for height is 
rejected: the common preference model of household resource allocation fails to be supported. 
If there is no gender preference, then the impact of either parent's education should be the 
same for both sons and daughters. Mother's education has a bigger impact on daughter's than son's 
height; father's education affects son's height more. For mothers, the differences are individually 
significant at low levels of education but disappear as education increases; in the case of fathers, the 
differences are significant only at higher levels of education. The weight for height regressions 
18 
suggest similar patterns although parental education tends to have a small and seldom significant 
effect. 
Mothers appear to devote resources to daughters and fathers to sons and, in many cases, the 
differences are significant. There is, then, evidence for gender bias in the allocation of resources 
and this evidence is more subtle than that considered in most other studies which only compare levels 
of outcomes. 
7. Conclusions 
The common preference model of household resource allocation postulates that all income 
is pooled and a dictator determines the allocation (or all household members have the same 
preferences): the effect of income under the control of different household members should be the 
same assuming it is measured without error. An equality restriction on unearned income effects is 
rejected for five of the six outcomes examined: nutrient intakes, fertility, child survival and child 
weight for height. Equality of asset income effects is rejected for the nutrient intake regressions. 
Ratios of income effects are not significantly different from each other. This is consistent 
with the common preference model as long as income is measured with error. It is also consistent 
with differential intra-household preferences but homogeneity in relative weights mothers and 
fathers attach to the health outcomes. 
It is the case, however, that unearned income in the hands of the mother is estimated to have 
a bigger impact on her family's health than income attributed to the father. For child survival 
probabilities, the effect is almost twenty times bigger. 
There is some evidence for gender preference: mothers prefer to devote resources to 
improving the heights and weights of their daughters, fathers to sons. The maternal income effects 
for both sons and daughters are much bigger than the effect of paternal income. It may be wise for 
programs aimed at improving the healthiness of urban households in Brazil -- and especially children 
-- to take into account the suggestion that resources in the hands of mothers appear to have a bigger 
impact on household and child health than resources controlled by fathers. 
19 
References 
Afriat, S. ()967), The construction of a utility function from expenditures data, International Economic 
Review, 8:67 - 77. 
Becker, G. S., (1964), Human Capital, Columbia University Press, New York 
Becker, G. S., (1974), A theory of social interactions. Journal of Political Economy. 87:1063-93. 
Becker, G. S., (1981), A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Behrman, J. R., (1988), Intrahousehold allocation of nutrients in rural India: Are boys favored? Do 
parents exhibit inequality aversion?, Oxford Economic Papers, 40:55-73. 
Behrman, J. R. and A. Deolaliker, (1988), Health and nutrition, in H. Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan, 
(eds.), Handbook of Development Economics, North Holland, Amsterdam. 
- - , (1989), The intrahousehold demand for nutrients in rural South India: individual estimates, fixed 
effects and permanent income, forthcoming, Journal of Human Resources. 
Behrman, J. R., R. A. Pollak, P. Taubman, (1982), Parental preferences and provisions for progeny, 
Journal of Political Economv, 90.1:52- 73. 
--, (1986), Do parents favor boys?, International Economic Review, 17.1:33-54. 
Bjorn, P. A. and Q. H. Vuong, (1984 ), Simultaneous equations models for dummy endogenous variables: a 
game theoretic formulation with an application to labor force participation, working paper, 
California Institute of Technology. 
Bjorn, P. A. and Q. H. Vuong, (1985), Econometric modelling of a Stackelberg game with an application 
to labor force participation, working paper, California Institute of Technology. 
Blumberg, R., (1988), Income under female versus male control: Hypotheses from a theory of gender 
stratification and data from the Third World, Journal of Family Issues, 9.1:51-84. 
Casterline, J., E. Cooksey and A. Ismail, (1987), Household income and child survival in Egypt, 
processed, Brown University. 
Chen, L., E. Huq and S. D'Souza, (] 98 I), Sex bias in the family allocation of food and health care in 
rural Bangladesh, Population and Development Review, 7.1:55-70. 
Chiappori, D. A., (1988a), Rational household labor supply, Econometrica 56.1:63-89. 
Chiappori, D. A., (I 988b), Nash bargained household decisions, International Economic Review, 29:4 
Cochran, S., J. Leslie and D. O'Hara, (I 982), Parental education and child health: intercountry evidence, 
Health Policy and Education, 2:213-50. 
D'Souza, S. and L Chen, (1980), Sex differentials in mortality in rural Bangladesh, Population and 
Development Review, 6.2:257- 70. 
Deaton, A., (I 987), The allocation of goods within the household: adults, children and gender, working 
paper, Princeton University. 
20 
Efron, B., (1982), The jackknife, the bootstrap and other resampling plans, SIAM CBMS-NSF 
Monograph, 38. 
Evenson, R. E., B. M. Popkin and E. K. Quizon, (1980), Nutrition, work and demographic behavior in 
rural Philippine households, in H. Binswanger et al., (eds), Rural Household Studies in Asia, 
Singapore University Press, Singapore. 
Folbre, N., (1984), Household production in the Philippines: a non-neoclassical approach, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 32.2, 303-330. 
Folbre, N., (1986), Cleaning house, Journal of Development Economics. 22, 5-40. 
Goldani, A. M., (1989), Women's transitions: the intersection of female life course, family and 
demographic transition in Twentieth Century Brazil, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Texas at Austin. 
Gronau, R., (1985), The allocation of goods within the household and estimation of adult equivalence 
scales: how to separate the men from the boys, manuscript, Hebrew University. 
Hartmann, H. I., (198 I), The family as the locus of gender, class and political struggle: the example of 
housework,~. 6:3 366-394. 
Henriques, M. H., (1988), Marriage systems changes in Brazil, mimeo, Fordham University. 
Horton, S., (1986), Child nutrition and family size in the Philippines, Journal of Development 
Economics, 23:161-176. 
Horton, S., (1988), Birth order and child nutrition status: evidence on the intra-household allocation of 
resources in the Philippines, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 36.2:341-54. 
Horney, M. J. and M. B. McElroy, (1988 ), The household allocation problem: empirical results from a 
bargaining model, Research in Population Economics, 6:15-38. 
IBGE, (1982), Perfil Estatistico de Criancas e Maes no Brasil. Caracteristicas Socio-Demograficas, 1970-
77, Rio de Janeiro. 
IBGE, (1988), Perfil Estatistico de Criancas e Maes no Brasil. A Situacao da Fecundidade: Determinantes 
Gerais e Caracteristicllc: ,ill Trl!nc:icllO RPcentP, Rio rlP J:mPiro. 
Jaeckel, L. A., (I 972), Estimating regression coefficients by minimizing the dispersion of residuals, 
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 42: I 020-34. 
Kakwani, N., (1986), Is sex bias significant?, Wider Working Paper 9, Helsinki. 
Knight, P., D. Mahar and R. Moran, (1979), Brazil : Human Resources Special Report, World Bank, 
Washington. 
Kooreman, P., (1988), Household labor force participation as a cooperative game: an empirical model, 
mimeo, Tilburg University. 
Martorell, R and J.-P. Habicht, (1986), Growth in Early CHildhood in Developing Countries in F. 
Falkner and J. Tanner, (eds.), Human Growth: A Comprehensive Treatise, Vol 3, 2nd edition, 
Plenum Press, New York. 
McElroy, M. B., (1988), The empirical content of Nash-bargained household behavior, mimeo, Duke 
University. 
21 
- - and M. J. Horney, (I 98 I), Nash bargained household decisions, International Economic Review, 
22:333-50. 
-- and M. J. Horney, (1988), Nash bargained household decisions: Reply, mimeo, Duke University. 
Manser, M. and M. Brown, (1979), Bargaining analysis of household decisions, in C. B. Lloyd, E. S. 
Andrews and C. L. Gilroy (eds) Women in the Labor Force, Columbia University Press, New 
York. 
--, (1980), Marriage and household decision making: a bargaining analysis, International Economic 
Review, 21.1:31-44. 
Mensch, B., H. Lentzner and S. Preston, (1986), Socio-Economic differentials in Child Mortality in 
Developing Countries, United Nations, New York. 
National Center for Health Statistics, (I 976), Growth Charts, US Department of Health and Human 
Services, Public Health Service, Health Resources Administration. 
National Research Council, (1983), Levels and Recent Trends in Fertility and Mortality in Brazil, Report 
# 21, National Academy Press. 
Neuhouser, K, (1989), Sources of women's power and status among the urban poor in contemporary 
Brazil,~. 14.3 685- 702. 
Oliveira, M. C. and E. S. Berquo, (1988 ), The family in Brazil: demographic analysis and recent trends, 
IUSSP working paper, Liege. 
Pitt, M., (1983), Food preferences and nutrition in rural Bangladesh, Review of Economics and Statistics, 
65.1:105-14. 
Pitt, M., M. Rosenzweig and N. Hassan, (1989), Productivity, health and inequality in the intrahousehold 
distribution of food in low-income countries, Economic Development Center Bulletin 89-1, 
University of Minnesota. 
Psacharopolous G. and A. M. Arriagada, (I 989), The determinants of early age human capital formation: 
evidence from Brazil, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 37:683-708. 
Rosenzweig, M. and T. P. Schultz, (1982), Market opportunities, genetic endowments and the intrafamily 
distribution of resources, American Economic Review, 72. 
Schofield, (1979), Development and the Problems of Village Nutrition, Croom Heim, London. 
Schultz, T. P., (1987), School expenditures and enrollments, 1960-1980, in D. G. Johnson and R. Lee 
(eds.), Population Growth and Economic Development, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison. 
Schultz, T. P., (1988a), Wage opportunities and family labor supply behavior in Thailand, 1976-1981, 
mimeo, Yale University. 
Schultz, T. P., (1988b), Women and development: objectives, framework and policy interventions, 
mimeo, Yale University. 
Schultz, T. P., (1989), An individualistic approach to family labor supply and fertility, mimeo, Yale 
University 
22 
Schultz, T. P., (I 989), School expenditures and enro11ments, 1960-1980: The effects of income, prices 
and population, in D. G. Johnson and R. Lee, (eds.). Population growth and economic 
development, Madison, WI. 
Sen, A., (1984), Family and food: sex bias in poverty, in A. Sen, Resources, Value and Development, 
Blackwell, London. 
Sen, A. and S. Sengupta, (1983), Malnutrition of rural children and the sex bias, Economic and Political 
Weekly. 18:855-864. 
Senauer, B., M. Garcia and E. Jacinto, (1988), Determinants of the intrahousehold allocation of food in 
the rural Philippines, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 70.1:170-80. 
Strauss, J., (1982), Determinants of food consumption in rural Sierra Leone, Journal of Development 
Economics. 11.3:327-54. 
Strauss, J., (1989), Households, communities and preschool children's nutrition outcomes: evidence from 
rural Cote d'Ivoire, Economic Development and Cultural Change, forthcoming. 
Strauss, J. and D. Thomas, (I 989), The relationship between calories and income: non-parametric 
evidence as a guide, work in progress. 
Svedberg, P., (1988), Undernutrition in sub-Saharan Africa: is there sex bias?, Wider Working Paper, 
Helsinki. 
Thomas, D., J. Strauss and M. H. Henriques, (l 987), Child survival, nutritional status and household 
characteristics: some evidence from Brazil, Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper, Yale 
~University 
Thomas, D., J. Strauss and M. H. Henriques, (1988), Survival rates, height for age and household 
characteristics in Brazil, forthcoming, Journal of Development Economics. 
Trussell, T. J. and S. Preston, (1982), Estimating the covariates of child mortality from retrospective 
reports of mothers, Health Policv and Education, 3:1-36. 
Ulph, D., (1988), A general non-cooperative nash model of household consumption behaviour, mimeo, 
Bristol University. 
Varian, H., (I 982), The nonparametric appraoch to demand analysis, Econometrica, 50:945-73. 
Waterlow, J., R. Buzina, W. Keller, J. Lane, M. Nichman and J. Tanner, (1977), The presentation and use 
of height and weight data for comparing the nutritional status of groups of children under the 
age of ten years, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 55:489-98. 
White, H., (1980), A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix and a direct test for 
heteroskedastici ty, Econometrica, 48:817 -38. 
23 
TABLE la 
Mean household, father and mother income by deciles of household per capita expenditure 
Decile Total income Unearned income 
of PCE RH Father Mother HR Father Mother 
1 5412 4073 853 1028 566 385 
2 8921 6576 1126 1360 856 411 
3 11385 8118 1394 1835 1158 534 
4 14496 10190 1696 2426 1605 648 
5 17482 12201 2158 3099 2025 751 
6 21708 15441 2725 4022 2815 960 
7 27488 20182 3345 5694 4150 1127 
8 36971 27667 4759 8652 6281 1824 
9 52507 39407 7610 12281 8633 3043 
10 117667 95142 16464 36528 27445 7077 
Average 31401 23897 4213 7692 5553 1676 
TABLE lb 
Mean nutrient intakes and child health outcomes by deciles of household PCE 
Decile Household level Mother level Child level 
of HR per capita intake of # Children Survival Height Weight 
PCE calories protein ever born Rate for age for hgt 
1 1460 425 7.36 0. 771 91.10 99.21 
2 1744 518 6.56 0.809 92.61 98. 72 
3 1931 574 5.80 0.825 93.66 99.70 
4 2067 630 5.19 0.850 94.61 100.10 
5 2185 683 4.65 0.860 95.58 99.82 
6 2276 723 4.28 0.880 96.34 100.10 
7 2329 762 3.75 0.887 97.38 100.69 
8 2407 806 3.40 0.907 98.33 102.19 
9 2427 843 3.11 0.915 99.45 103.37 
10 2417 889 2. 77 0.938 100.69 105.35 
Average 2116 681 4.69 0.864 95.97 100.92 
# obs 27547 24240 26538 
Notes: per capita expenditure (PCE) defined to exclude all infrequent purchases such 
as durables. Protein intake measured in grams. Height for age and weight for 
height are percentages of United States NCHS median. 
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TABLE 2 
Effect of mother's and father's unearned income on household and child health 
log(caloric log(protein # children Survival log(weight log(height 
intake) intake) ever born rate for height for age) 
LINEAR MODEL UNEARNED INCOME of 
1.218 0.437 0.110Mother 0.456 -5. 911 0.317 
[2. 4] [3.7] [3.7] [3.3] [3.6) [2.0] 
Father 0.063 0.170 -0.734 0.024 0.039 0.026 
[2.0] [2.3) [1. 9] [1. 7] [2. 8] [1.8] 
0.022Other -0.100 0.074 -1.169 0.066 -0.027 
[O. 7] [0.7] [2.6] [1.4] [1. 3] [2.7] 
TESTS for equality of income effects 
mother-father 2.75 14.17 10.26 9.69 9.18 2.17 
[14.0][p-value] [9. 7] [0.0) [0.1] [0.2] [0.2] 
TESTS for joint significance 
All coeffs 102.80 132.87 339.85 168.82 38.84 187.12 
7.68Income 8.96 26.34 26.50 17.30 12.49 
QUADRATIC MODEL UNEARNED INCOME of 
Mother 1.519 3.146 -12.774 0.998 
[6.4] [10.0] [7. 2 J [6.5] 
- - squared -1. 892 -3.487 10.395 -0.850 
[4.9) [5. 6 l [5.0) [4. 2] 
Father 0.243 0.651 -2.714 0.045 
[3. 7 J [7. 2 l [4.1) [O. 9] 
- - squared -0.054 -0.145 0.559 -0.000 
[3. 6 l [6.0] [3. 8 J [0.6) 
Other -0.961 -0.238 -4.489 0.570 
[2.4) [0.4] [0.7] [1.4] 
0.524 0.178 1. 890 -0.283-- squared 
[2.5] [0.6) [0.6] [1. 3] 
-
SLOPEs of income effects at mean 
Mother 0.89 1. 99 -9.24 0. 71 
Father 0.18 0.49 -2.07 0.04 
TESTS for equality of income effects 
mother-father 4.14 12.00 94. 20 11. 71 
[p-value] [1. 6) [O.O] [0.0] [0.0) 
TESTS for joint significance 
All coeffs 96.45 126.73 311. 53 150.49 
44.02Mother's income 20.80 64.30 59.11 
Father's income 6.49 32.65 17.10 8.92 
Other income 2.99 0.26 0.40 1.00 
NOTES: Income in Cr$ mills. Includes dummies for state of residence, parental education & 
Household head's age (& age ) in nutrient intake regressions; dummiesexistence included. 2 
for mother's age in fertility & survival regressions; dummies for child's age and sex in 
for height and height for age are %ages of US NCHSanthropometric regressions. Weight 
x2 medians. [t statistics] below ests; [p values*lOO] below test statistics; ts and s 
based on heteroskedasticity consistent estimates of covariance matrix. 
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TABLE 3 
Robustness of estimated parental income effects 
and tests for equality of effects 
Impact of unearned income conditional 
Nutrient demand 
log(per capita calories) 
log(per capita protein) 
Fertility and child survival 
children ever born 
survival rate 
Anthropometrics 
log(height for age) 
log(weight for height) 
Impact of asset income 
Nutrient demand 
log(per capita calories) 
log(per capita protein) 
Fertility and child survival 
children ever born 
survival rate 
Anthropometrics 
log(height for age) 
log(weight for height) 
x2Maternal Paternal for equal 
income income income effects 
on reporting any unearned income 
0.356 0.044 3.29 
[2 .1 l [1. 6 l [19.3] 
1.133 0.141 9.78 
[3.7] [1. 9] [O. 8] 
-6 .137 -0.595 6.92 
(0. 2] [o. 3 J (98.9] 
0.462 0.022 7.95 
[0.0] [O. 2] [100.0] 
0.135 0.032 2.70 
[2. OJ [3. l] [25.9] 
0.309 0.039 9.52 
[ 3. 6 J [l. 7] [O. 9 l 
1. 64 0.25 10.59 
[4.1] [2.0] [0.0] 
2.80 0.79 5.99 
[ 3. 6 J [2.8] [5.0] 
-0.68 -0.24 0.02 
[0.2] [0.3] [98.9] 
-0.01 -0.01 0.00 
[0.0] [0.2] [100.0] 
0.85 0.12 2.03 
[1. 7 l [1.8] [36.3] 
2.19 0.14 2.29 
[1.6] [1.4 l [31. 8 l 
Notes: See Table 2. Asset income is income from financial and physical 
assets; income measured in Cr$1,000,000. 
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TABLE 4 




log (per capita calories) 
log (per capita protein) 
Fertility and child survival 
children ever born 
child survival 
Anthropometrics 
log(height for age) 
log(weight for height) 
ASSET INCOME 
Nutrient demand 
log (per capita calories) 
log (per capita protein) 
Fertility and child survival 
children ever born 
child survival 
Anthropometrics 
log(height for age) 
log(weight for height) 
Notes: See Tables 2 and 3. 
to father's income effects 
Ratio of Wald test 
income effects x2 p-value 
7.23 0.32 (0.85)7.16 
8.05 1.10 (0.58)18.21 
8.12 0.53 (0. 77)4.23 
6.44 1. 24 (0.87)3.53 
2.80 0.00 (1.00)
0.93 
15.57 0.29 (0.99)7.04 
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TABLE 5 
Tests for differences in levels of height for age and weight for height 
by gender of child 
Age in Mean height for age 
months Female Male Diff SE t p-value 
0- 5 100.39 99.08 1.308 0.34 3.9 0.0 
6- 23 96.13 96.20 -0.068 0.21 0.3 37.3 
24- 59 95.97 95.91 0.058 0.14 0.4 33.9 
60-107 95.70 95.39 0.306 0.11 2.8 0.3 
All 96.08 95.87 0.209 0.07 2.6 0.1 
Age in Mean weight for height 
months Fe.mA]P. MA 1 P. Di ff SE t p-value 
0- 5 104.21 108.48 -4.266 1.11 3.9 0.0 
6- 23 104.85 104.42 0.423 0.49 0.9 19.4 
24- 59 100.70 100.26 0.443 0.26 1. 7 4.4 
60-107 99.94 98.91 1.034 0.22 4.8 0.0 
All 101.17 100.67 0.498 0.17 3.0 0.2 
Notes: See Jable 2b; height for age and weight for height are 
relative to US median. Diff is female-male; SE its standard 
error and t the associated t statistic. 
p-values are multiplied by 100. 
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TABLE 6 
Testing for gender bias : determinants of anthropometric outcomes by sex of child 
WEIGHT FOR HEIGHT HEIGHT FOR AGE 
Females Males Difference Females Males Difference 
UNEARNED INCOME 
0.243 0.094 0.149Mother 1.097 0.198 0.899 
[2. 7) [ 3. 5 J [2.2) [1.4] [l. 9 l [0.8] 
Father 0.006 0.070 -0.064 0.023 0.031 -0.008 
[0.3) [2. 8] [2. ol [3.1] [1. 6] [0 .4] 
0.020 0.793 -0.045Other -0.045 2.923 -2.968 
[6.7] [3.0] [ 3. l] [4.0) [1. 6 l [1. 6] 
EDUCATION (1) if 
Mother 
0.495literate -0.338 0.126 -0.464 1. 756 1.261 
[1.1) [0.4] [1.1] [11. 5 l [8.2) [2.3] 
completed 0.116 0.641 -0.525 2.681 2.322 0.359 
elementary [0. 3] [l. 6] [0.9] [13.8] [11. 7) [1. 3 l 
completed 2.499 1. 979 0.520 4.101 3.705 0.396 
secondary [4.3] [ 3. s l [0.7] [15.8] [14.6] [1.1] 
Father 
-0.282 -0.423 1.094 1. 517 -0.423literate -0.705 
[2.0) [0. 8] [0.8] [6.2] [8.6) [l. 7] 
completed -0.406 0.411 0. 821 2.297 2.671 -0.374 
elementary [0.9] [l. Oj [1. 3 l [10.7] [12.3] [1. 2 l 
completed 0.845 1. 949 -1.104 3.558 4.319 -0.761 
secondary [1.5] [ 3. 6 J [1.4] (13.5] [16.6J [2. l] 
TESTS 
of joint significance 
Income 6.71 10.89 2.53 3.54 
[0.1] [0. l] [11.1] [6.0) 
Education 
203.20Mother 4.59 7.33 275.30 
(\ (\ c;
v.v.JFather 3.32 146.90 201.30 
of equality of effects 
Income 
1. 34mother-father 7.14 4.14 1.51 
[0. 3] [4. 2] [21.8] [24.7] 
11 
- - -other 13.40 11. 95 1.67 3.74 
[0.1] [0. 3] [43.4) [15 .4] 
Education 
1. 93mother-father 2.78 0.79 7.03 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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